

13 Feb 89

Great Dilemma is an Embarrassment (in Age of Reagan)
(Maoist Challenge) in sight of having
a stigma to be hidden, apologized for
(potential shame - see Stevenson, "Munich")

but gives the a sense of Shame and Guilt
with respect to what they did go along with, or propose.

(yet, the feel self-righteous about latter;

Mean, they are
Less Evil, i.e.

there were Lesser Evils,

necessary (we def)

not Evil at all,

but Good (Optimal)

esp. compared to what Right proposal
had been done and
what would have happened if

(if hadn't "compromised," been tough,
rejected "Munich," won elections,
kept office and "credibility" and)

("certain")

they had been replaced by likely rivals
(esp. after above policies had led to failure)

Some truth to this (e.g. if winners had gone
in (unhappily) in 1962, and Reps had won
(Schles - who also says, "If JFK had gotten it in 1963
and Eisenhower had won in 1964 (come on...!))

But judgment of political "impossibility" of doing better,
avoiding social risks altogether - at obvious personal
political risk - is very self-serving, biased, not
based on or conducive to real search for
alternatives (that involve acceptance of potential
s-t personal/Pol risks - except Ball
Stevenson)

Taylor 78:

anti-stress rather

than mind;

Fullbright: mind (Cass)

rather than blockade

(i.e. about 50 shifts;

he didn't know of 20/40,000

It is not enough to define, not to be Good, but to

be (Optimal/Better than Alternatives (like "dream SS")

when this means, say, Less Evil; or, aspire to avoid,

not Evil. i.e. to do it.

Friday Feb 13th 89

Hypo:

1. JFK's reaction was initially "he must go" —
after a year of Mayaguez, invasion + assess plus,
and words of intent (never-admitted) went to planning on
3 military (+ count) ops, he was primed, cocked, to
think of military response

2 — but quickly (Tues? Wed? ^{thru?} no later than Thurs)
realized he could no longer talk on the down
directly (whether or not missiles were operational — to
attack Laos guaranteed — he thought, and said
(if he exaggerated his belief, all the more signs he was
not going to disavow — rather — the — Trade (Oct 27)

3 Hyp: leading planning ⁵ was ⁽³⁾ to show military he was
"willing" to back up his threat

(b) in case it looked worth doing before election:
sooner

e.g. if indication that SSMS would arrive (SI;
crates — putting blockade to stop the
maybe using this as excuse
for invasion, along with attack
a Guatemala (RFX, Oct 16!)

US would expect
this! Look (?)
was a surprise!

or if caught in very early stage (mistake)

P. (4) John, "meeting" was to build commitment for
blockade, to cover him (meeting included McCon, Taylor (w/ Dillon? Rhee?)

like CBV meeting in July '65. (McG B)

and to staff it out.

5. Good doctor approach — not leading to Frank trade
("long show toughness ... bloody ... on JFM... WPB

as in VN:

Some violent
corrosive canals in
our pond

to avoid don, approach
(HAK: How get without threat of V?)

Hanoi bombing

^{Good doctor}
Has this even worked — gotta credit for toughness,
despite a bad deal?

It is only real move to VCS + Repub/Dem Rights —
(Agree)

Points up "summer"

(if its that important — and you're
willing to do that much...) (+, you missed us...)

kill 1 airstrike, but not 2nd one, before Cuban I!
same cover immediate work.

"Operational" was a cover; missiles were wholly probable,
if you could find them — not quick-firing.

(but if hidden — could perhaps be fired belatedly,
not "under attack") (Taylor from).

Hyp: "Good Doctor" is just a way of temporizing, a desperate,
emotional ~~the~~ rationale for doing nothing — that never
works — when you

(was there any thought of ²⁾ terminating RT if it
didn't work

(b) on making a real deal? No indication, with
CBS! (bits of JTM)

Unlike Cuba II — a deal there got missiles out,
retrofitting US public, if not NATO... in VN, no.

— to the — from Oct ^{(18) or 20} ~~RT~~ ^{RT} ~~was~~, ~~that~~ (pass. afternoon of 16th? 6)
a big bluff — but with real chance of getting out of
control (because VCS was focused, "troops" were at high pitch...
on Seattle story... a screening

This is at least true of RFR ULT (possibly a bluff!)

— Real revolution — but also is big of much earlier notes;

Suppose column a blat; RFR-Dec 23 Oct (Pompeo must have been a

15 Feb 89

Themes

* — "Turning the screw" ^{46,} McN ^{VRT}
— wrong analogy to VN from Cuban II, Berlin

— Terror, Torture (Pat)
— Berlin, Cuban II, and VN VN
a right?
not, a wrong?

* — Not true that ^{though, "I diluted the idea of - invasion"}
though in Diller 72: no "real risk" 87, 100
— 1) Hawks thought there would be no risk;

see (wrong)
87-89

or — 2) Downs (JFK, by 2nd week) was not willing to
take, raise, making huge even small risks.

Bath down and Hawks saw significant risks — ^{if US attack}
which they wild accept, making (and some risk to all
under-estimated!)

RFK?
for?

the Hawks, quite willingly, without arguing
the downs* (JFK; Ball; McN; Rusk)
with arguing, perhaps very reluctantly,
under pressure from others or boss (JFK from
ExCom, Oct 27): "as in Mulgan: good boys"

Hawks at least
saw large stakes
(and lower risk
than downs saw)

and downs accepted these risks despite a
series of very limited stakes: psychological
political
(not choice in global
balance of power, but
alone, so attack)

JFK, Oct 24: 8 letters RFK
514

Mr. * Downs saw risk even in

blockade, which they supported — (though Stevenson,
esp. as it led toward attack, with reservations: he
wanted to leave its
risks)

— h (special pleading) hindsight: ^{we had not been forewarned}
R move (which failed) was doomed to fail,
crazy, reckless (therefore could not have
been foreseen)

X

— JFK failed to foresee: ^{he was} blind to, could not imagine...
[ignores JFK knowledge of mongoose;
did ONE know this? Bobby, Thompson?]

JFK approach (which succeeded, without war):

Bound to succeed,
no great (unseen) risk
not reckless

(vs. JFK est.)
(despite his pos of 30
reserves)

Necessary, obligatory

reasonable, sane + JFK's power & influence

Could not (even JFK) have led to war: or more war

McG B

+ K learned, so hereafter both were prudent,
sane, responsible — Thankfully — risks of one
war, CW, intentions, as now, all moderate/
negligible, lower than before, diminishing.

(despite evidence of loss of control by both;
and evidence ^{VN} since of the "committing" nature
of "graduated response")

2) reluctance of USG to compromise, concede

(JFK did not, in Cuba II, or VN)

(he may have contemplated it; & the unified
Stemmen — as Ball was later isolated)

3) lack of limits on deliberate, gradual, etc.,